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1. Introduction 
The sublime in speech Longinus writes about is one of the 
most powerful ways of forging a community, and yet 
breaks the rules of rhetoric and remains largely beyond 
the reach of praxis as rational action; in Kant the 
experience of the sublime points towards the 
indeterminate or incommensurate aspects of the relation 
between reason and imagination (the contrary of beauty); 
in Adorno and Lyotard, the sublime re-emerges, not as a 
form or experience of transcendent domination or power 
but on the contrary as a limes notion, a happening 
rupturing a totalising, reifying rationality, an 
"unconstructable question" (Bloch). The sublime becomes 
associated to “truthfulness to metaphysics in its moment 
of collapse”, with the infinity and individuality of 
personal existence, of the other – perhaps, in a way, 
combining the Kantian sublime with the Kantian 
categorical imperative after Schiller – or combining a 
notion of the tragic with that of the sublime, not unlike 
Schelling, for whom the sublime is the infinite in the finite, 
and tragedy its mediated representation.  
An ethical sense of the sublime can be traced in Levinas 
and in Buber’s philosophy of the dialogic encounter. 
Ideology as discursive appropriation of an unnameable 
sublime experience defining inclusion and exclusion and 
thus playing a formative role in the formation of a 
community by giving it a desire, an orientation – an 
unreachable real beyond symbolisation - finally becomes 
important in Zizek’s retrieval of Hegel’s Absolute via 
Lacan – a movement in which the links between the 
sublime, the utopian or even messianic, and the structure 
of identification and desire become clear.  
Throughout the history of philosophy, the notion of the 
sublime has played a complex and subtle role mediating 
disruption and unification, in art (including rhetoric) as 
well as in ethics, philosophical anthropology, and 
metaphysics – a shibboleth for incommensurability. The 
importance of the sublime in the emergence of 
communities can, for the modern public sphere, be 
illustrated by reference to the emergence of an aesthetic of 
the sublime in The Spectator (1711), from which the title of 
this paper is chosen.  
But also systematically, the question what the sublime and 
communication as the process lying at the basis of 
community have to do with each other is important, for it 
can help us gain a deeper sense of the paradoxical nature 
of both communication and community, and thus show us 
a way out of their commoditised representations in many 
areas of philosophy, communication theory and cultural 
policy today. 
2. 
The experience of the sublime has been identified in 
rhetoric as well as in philosophy as both ensuring, or 
incorporating, communicability, and as putting a limit to 
it or even placing it fundamentally in question. What is 
the role of the sublime in communication? 
Do we have to speak of the sublime at all? As a category of 
rhetoric, it refers to elated speech. As a category of 
aesthetics it refers to an experience of shiver or awe in the 
face of that which exceeds us, the other of harmonious – or 
for that matter upsetting – beauty. The sublime means 
chaos, not so much the de(con)struction or interruption of 
order, as a “Durcheinander” (a tangle, a muddle). The 
sublime presence of the face, the sublime character of the 
body, the sublime beauty of the mountains, the sky or the 
ocean, excites everything together and at once. The 
sublime is related to the oceanic feeling Romain Roland 
confessed to Freud (but it is not quite the same). We are 
filled with awe. 
A ground motif of elevation, excess, lifting up, being 
confronted with or transported to a different order, an 
incommensurability – in a word, transcendence, is present 
in the idea of the sublime. [Pierre Bourdieu: “The negation 
of a transcendent reality in the current media and 
technological society is a perfect crime that involves the 
destruction of reality.”] Where the content of what 
transcends has been made available, the sublime acquires 
the traits of the grandiose, the overpowering, the 
pornographic, violating or intimidating. Can these things 
be still sublime? The sublime as the necessarily subtle or 
slight offers perhaps a more fruitful avenue for thought – 
even in the Alps or in a storm, where a stillness has to 
pervade me and the ‘forces of nature’ for the sublime to 
arrive – or I arrest with a stillness when a sight of the 
sublime catches hold of me. I am speechless, because I am 
being spoken to. The sublime is not only an aspect of our 
relation with the world or with nature, it is also an aspect 
of our relations with each other. A communicative 
dimension is opened up, in dialogical terms: in the 
sublime we experience a Gegenüber, an over-against. 
The sublime, as that which is, as Kant said, absolutely, not 
comparatively, great, can be experienced only in an 
attunement of the tragic. The confrontation of finitude 
with infinity is not that of a not-yet, or a progression, but 
of an incommensurability (Schelling). Only when infinity 
is found back within the subject, as in Schiller’s text on the 
sublime, can the feeling that accompanies the sublime be 
understood as one of “both pain and joy”, as Schiller says. 
Our freedom, the freedom of our will, is commensurate to 
the sublime, it is the moral version of the natural sublime, 
and the basis of respect, or awe for humanity (Kant). The 
sublime is, and remains, tragic however, because in 
showing this commensurablity, it opens up another 
incommensurability, that between these two versions of it: 
nature and freedom; both are sublime but appear to move 
in different directions. 
When Derrida says the sublime is dependent on the 
colossali, he ignores the ontological difference between the 
finite and the infinite – establishing a possible connection, 
a Kantian might say, between the beautiful and the 
sublime – the ground motif of commoditisation or 
fetishisation. And perhaps this is a basic trait of his 
thinking – difference moves within a single plain, it 
receives its force from a reduction of the transcendent to 
the force of the text – and that is the rhetorical, or what 
once went under that name. Longinus already explained 
that the sublime does not depend on force as a colossal 
effect, but on the carefully chosen and awaited movement 
which interrupts a normal flow, the sublime is not the 
grandiose; the space of perversion is opened up by the 
sublime – in its inverted image, the sublime shows our 
liability to grandiosity and kitsch (and perhaps this is the 
form in which it has been operative in post-modernism, as 
philosophical and existential kitsch, an inverted jargon of 
authenticity). Kitsch is a perversion of the sublime, not of 
the beautiful – hence kitsch can be quite beautiful and 
likeable. 
The sublime is related to the deep as Longinus says when he 
asks whether or not there is an art pertaining to these 
things [ei estin hupsous tis he bathous techne (Longinus 2.1) – 
to which the answer is a highly qualified yes – ‘yes, 
but...’], in the manner in which we can call the blue of the 
sky “deep”, or indeed a joke, or philosophy. It has no end, 
its identity is yet to appear. A contradictory pattern of 
movement is present, uniting the endless with the idea of 
arriving into one’s being: dare we say – essence? The 
relation between finitude and infinity is that of a 
belonging together without being able to specify exactly 
how and why – a having and not-having at the same time, 
or to use another platonic expression, the desire and 
pursuit of the whole. A not-knowing and not-yet being, 
oriented, directed, yet without form. The sublime is placed 
in the rupture between silence and the word, between 
wonder and the question, between address and response, 
causality and freedom, permanently dislodging and 
linking them. The sublime is a category of the moment, a 
momentary event – and here again we encounter a motif 
of classical metaphysics: the moment does not belong to 
time. Longinus is aware of this – the sublime works like a 
‘sudden flash of lightning’, and is not so much persuasive 
as irresistible (1.3). Augenblick, verweile doch, du bist so 
schön. 
Insofar as the sublime is an experience or apprehension, it 
refers to, and is possible on the basis of, what I would like 
to call (following Coreth) the ground-freedom in being, by 
or in which we are given into a freedom in which 
experience, knowledge, mediation (and hence 
communication) is possible. The mediation of the sublime, 
that between finitude and the infinite is the core of the 
mediation of immediacy – it is the place of encounter in 
which there is always more to meet, the symbolic 
intention. The sublime is a category of mediation. 
This structure is the ground structure of metaphysics (and 
pervades even its methodology), in distinction to 
Heidegger’s view of metaphysics as onto-theology or 
presence, or the postmodern view of the metaphysical 
tradition as presence and phallo-logo-centrism. Both 
views of metaphysics make it impossible to see the human 
sublime; both readings of metaphysics make it impossible 
to understand communication, communicability, 
community. The encounter between people shares in the 
phenomenology of the sublime, think, for example, of 
Levinas’ remarks about the face as that which is always 
already beyond our representations of it, or Buber’s 
description of the encounter with the particular other, in 
which the other is not experienced but becomes the 
conduit for the appearance of the world, someone I stand 
over-against. A polyphony of voices shares in these 
dimensions of the sublime, each incommensurably 
referring to the others as the possible response to being-
heard. 
Here it is necessary to refer to the historical emergence of 
the discourse of the sublime, which coincides with the 
emergence of the public sphere as described by Habermas. 
Longinus’ essay is one of the few texts from antiquity 
which are never referred to by other classical authors 
whose texts have come to us, and it is the only one dealing 
with the sublime. Only in the 17th century did it start to 
fully exercise its influence. An aesthetic of the sublime has 
been traced in the texts of the Spectator and the Tatler; the 
treatise by Longinus started to influence European 
aesthetics and philosophy in a French translation by 
Boileau-Despréaux which was received in England 
(Burke) and in Germany (Kant). Interest in the sublime, 
the emergence of the public sphere and – differential 
calculus share a common ideational space. The 
constitution of an open commonality as much 
transcending each free individual exercise of the will as 
dependent upon it and its freedom is a feature of the 
public sphere, no less than of the aesthetic of the sublime. 
We see the paradox of communication, the mediation of 
immediacy, in both. With the rupture of the chain of 
being, infinity had been set free to commerce with the 
finite in an entirely different way than had been the case 
in the ordered universe of the Aristotelian-thomist world 
view, in which mediation is participation (realism), hence 
a form of non-being, or abstraction (nominalism), hence 
also a non-communicability. Individuum est ineffabile – the 
entire metaphysical tradition can agree on that, but now 
the sublime is the individual communicating. The sublime 
at the heart of the emergence of the constellation of the 
enlightened public and the romantic private establishes 
the tensions in the idea of community in modernity; if we 
fail to see it our theories of modernisation remain caught 
up in the dilemma of systemic differentiation versus 
legitimising discourse. The need, which has in my view 
become pressing, to find new ways to integrate an 
existential dimension in our theories of communication, 
media and modernisation, refers and depends on a 
rethinking of the sublime, beyond its classical rhetorical 
instrumentalisation, and equally beyond its facile 
implementation in a post-modern rhetoric of the terror of 
totality. That terror is with us, as the commoditisation of 
communication, but the post-modern authors have done 
more to install it than to undermine it. Such is the liability 
to perversion inherent in the sublime. 
 
 
Notes 
The sublime of ideology(Zizek) 
In the context of the sublime we encounter the idea of 
dignity. Longinus says (9.3) it is unthinkable that those 
who live smallish and slavish lives will ever produce 
anything that is worth to last forever and that the 
language of those who live and think significantly, will be 
significant. A sense of the colossal may be perceived, we 
would have to interpret it to show what it is capable of – 
perhaps it is more a sense of the excellent, the [aretes]. 
Schiller starts his essay on the sublime with Nathan’s 
word “kein Mensch muss müssen”, “no man should 
must”. “All things must, man is the creature which wills”. 
Violence or coercion are the most indignifying things 
human beings can be exposed to, “for violence annihilates 
them”. The sublime confronts us with the possibility of 
violence but also the fundamental sense in which we are 
free from violence, namely in the exercise of our will; 
ultimately, for Schiller, dignity is in our own hands. 
Almost a premonition of a “Sartrean sublime”.  The 
sublime, dignity – not categories for a bourgeois mind but 
sign-posts for a rediscovery of humanity. 
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